AWS CloudTrail Log Deleted
Detects deletion of an AWS CloudTrail trail via DeleteTrail API. Removing trails is a high-risk action that destroys an audit control plane and is frequently paired with other destructive or stealthy operations. Validate immediately and restore compliant logging.
Rule type: query
Rule indices:
- filebeat-*
- logs-aws.cloudtrail-*
Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-6m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteTrail.html
- https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/cloudtrail/delete-trail.html
Tags:
- Domain: Cloud
- Data Source: AWS
- Data Source: Amazon Web Services
- Data Source: AWS Cloudtrail
- Use Case: Log Auditing
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
Version: ?
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Disclaimer: This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
AWS CloudTrail is a service that enables governance, compliance, and operational and risk auditing of your AWS account. It logs API calls and related events, providing visibility into user activity. This rule identifies the deletion of an AWS log trail using the DeleteTrail API. Deleting a trail can eliminate visibility and is a strong indicator of defense evasion or sabotage.
- Actor & target
- Identify
aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn,user_agent.original,source.ip. - Confirm which trail was deleted (name/ARN, multi-region/organization status) from
aws.cloudtrail.request_parametersortarget.entity.id.
- Identify
- Blast radius
- Determine whether it was the only trail or if organization/multi-region coverage remains.
- Review preceding
StopLoggingorUpdateTrailand subsequent high-risk actions (IAM, S3, KMS, EC2 exports).
- Data preservation
- Verify S3 destinations and CloudWatch log groups for retained historical logs and file integrity validation.
- Planned deletion: Validate with tickets and decommissioning plans; ensure replacement/alternate trails exist.
- Recreate or re-enable compliant multi-region (or organization) trails immediately.
- Investigate the actor’s recent activity; rotate creds if compromise is suspected.
- Validate destination bucket policies, CMK policies, and event selectors for all active trails.
- Hardening: Restrict
cloudtrail:DeleteTrailand enforce guardrails via AWS Config/SCPs; alert on future deletions.
- AWS IR Playbooks
- AWS Customer Playbook Framework
- Security Best Practices: AWS Knowledge Center – Security Best Practices.
event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
and event.provider: "cloudtrail.amazonaws.com"
and event.action: "DeleteTrail"
and event.outcome: "success"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Impair Defenses
- Id: T1562
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
Sub Technique:
- Name: Disable or Modify Tools
- Id: T1562.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/