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Discovery Command Output Written to Suspicious File

Detects when a discovery command is executed followed by the immediate modification of a suspicious file via the same process. Many types of malware execute discovery commands, save the output to a file, and then exfiltrate that file via their C2 channel.

Rule type: eql
Rule indices:

  • logs-endpoint.events.process-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.file-*

Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:

Tags:

  • Domain: Endpoint
  • OS: macOS
  • Use Case: Threat Detection
  • Tactic: Collection
  • Tactic: Discovery
  • Data Source: Elastic Defend

Version: ?
Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=15s
  [process where host.os.type == "macos" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
    process.parent.name in ("bash", "sh", "zsh") and
    process.name in ("whoami", "ifconfig", "system_profiler", "dscl", "arch", "csrutil") and
    process.args_count == 1]
  [file where host.os.type == "macos" and event.action == "modification" and
    file.path like ("/Users/Shared/*", "/tmp/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/Library/WebServer/*",
                    "/Library/Graphics/*", "/Library/Fonts/*", "/private/var/root/Library/HTTPStorages/*", "/*/.*") and
    not file.path like ("/private/tmp/*.fifo", "/private/tmp/tcl-tk*")]
		

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK