FortiGate Administrator Account Creation from Unusual Source
This rule detects FortiGate administrator account creation from a source IP address not previously seen performing admin operations on the device. Threat actors exploiting CVE-2026-24858 (FG-IR-26-060) authenticate via FortiCloud SSO bypass and immediately create local administrator accounts for persistence, typically from infrastructure not associated with normal administrative activity.
Rule type: new_terms
Rule indices:
- logs-fortinet_fortigate.*
Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:
- https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/analysis-of-sso-abuse-on-fortios
- https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/fortinet_fortigate
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/01/28/fortinet-releases-guidance-address-ongoing-exploitation-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2026
Tags:
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Domain: Network
- Domain: Identity
- Data Source: Fortinet
- Data Source: Fortinet FortiGate
Version: ?
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
This alert indicates that an administrator account was created on a FortiGate device from a source IP address that has not been observed performing configuration changes in the recent history window. This is a behavioral indicator of compromise, as threat actors exploiting SSO bypass vulnerabilities typically operate from infrastructure not previously associated with the device.
- Review
source.ipto determine whether the IP address belongs to a known management network or authorized administrator location. Check against known threat infrastructure from The Constant Company LLC, BL Networks, and Kaopu Cloud HK Limited. - Examine
fortinet.firewall.cfgobjfor the name of the newly created account andfortinet.firewall.cfgattrfor the access profile assigned (especially super_admin). - Check
source.user.nameto identify the account that performed the creation and verify whether it was recently created itself or accessed via SSO. - Look for other configuration changes from the same source IP, including firewall policy modifications, configuration exports, or VPN user creation.
- Run
get system adminon the affected FortiGate to list all current administrator accounts and compare against the authorized list.
- Authorized administrators connecting from a new location (VPN, travel, new office).
- Initial device setup or migration where configuration changes come from temporary infrastructure.
- Managed service providers performing authorized administration from rotating IP addresses.
- If unauthorized, immediately delete the newly created administrator account and audit the source account for compromise.
- Block the source IP at the perimeter and check other FortiGate devices for activity from the same IP.
- Restore configuration from a known-clean backup and rotate all credentials including LDAP/AD accounts connected to the device.
- Upgrade FortiOS to a patched version and disable FortiCloud SSO if not required.
event.dataset: "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
event.code: "0100044547" and
fortinet.firewall.cfgpath: "system.admin" and
fortinet.firewall.action: "Add" and
fortinet.firewall.ui: (* and not "")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- Id: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Create Account
- Id: T1136
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
Sub Technique:
- Name: Local Account
- Id: T1136.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/