FortiGate Super Admin Account Creation
This rule detects the creation of an administrator account on a FortiGate device. Administrator account creation on these devices should be infrequent and tightly controlled. In the FG-IR-26-060 campaign, threat actors created super_admin accounts immediately after gaining initial access via FortiCloud SSO bypass to establish persistence.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-fortinet_fortigate.*
Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: ?
References:
- https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-060
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/analysis-of-sso-abuse-on-fortios
- https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/fortinet_fortigate
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/01/28/fortinet-releases-guidance-address-ongoing-exploitation-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2026
Tags:
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Domain: Network
- Domain: Identity
- Data Source: Fortinet
- Data Source: Fortinet FortiGate
Version: ?
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
This alert indicates that an administrator account was created on a FortiGate device. Administrator creation events on these devices are generally rare and should be closely scrutinized, as they are a key persistence mechanism used in the FG-IR-26-060 campaign.
In the observed campaign, threat actors created multiple super_admin accounts (audit, backup, support, itadmin, secadmin, remoteadmin) within seconds of initial access to ensure persistent control even if individual accounts are discovered and removed.
- Review
fortinet.firewall.cfgobjfor the name of the newly created account and examinefortinet.firewall.cfgattrto determine the access profile assigned to the account (especially super_admin). - Review
source.user.nameto determine which account performed the creation andfortinet.firewall.uifor the source interface and IP address. Verify whether this administrator is authorized to provision accounts. - Check whether a login event (especially via SSO) occurred shortly before the account creation. Analyze the timing between events.
- Check
observer.nameto identify the FortiGate device and runget system adminto get the current administrator list. Check other FortiGate devices in the fleet for the same account name.
- Authorized provisioning of a new administrator account through an approved change management process.
- Initial device setup where administrator accounts are created as part of deployment.
- Migration or device replacement scenarios where accounts are replicated from another device.
- If unauthorized, delete the administrator account immediately and audit the creating account for compromise.
- Treat the device configuration as compromised and restore from a known-clean backup.
- Check all FortiGate devices for similar account creation and upgrade FortiOS to a patched version.
- If the activity is expected, document the provisioning activity and the business justification.
any where event.dataset == "fortinet_fortigate.log" and
event.code == "0100044547" and
fortinet.firewall.cfgpath == "system.admin" and
fortinet.firewall.action == "Add" and
fortinet.firewall.cfgattr like~ "*accprofile[super_admin]*"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- Id: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Create Account
- Id: T1136
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
Sub Technique:
- Name: Local Account
- Id: T1136.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/001/