Anthropic Organization Domain Boundary Changed
Verified organization domains control which email addresses can join or be pulled into an Anthropic tenant. Verifying, claiming, adding, or removing a domain changes the tenant boundary and can pull in attacker-controlled mailboxes or push out legitimate corporate domains. These events are infrequent and affect organization-wide membership trust.
Rule type: esql
Rule indices:
Rule Severity: high
Risk Score: 73
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: GenAI
- Domain: Identity
- Platform: Anthropic
- Data Source: Anthropic Audit Logs
- Use Case: Identity and Access Audit
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Rule Type: ES|QL
- Tactic: Persistence
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Verified domains control which email domains are trusted for membership. Verifying, adding, removing, or claiming a domain changes the tenant boundary (attacker-controlled mailboxes in, or corporate domains out).
Unauthorized = domain not on the corporate allowlist / merger plan, domain_claim_initiated without DNS ownership
work, or domain change paired with external invites or SSO changes.
- Read
event.actionandanthropic.audit.domain(may be empty onorg_domain_add_initiated/domain_claim_initiated— pivot org + nearby domain events to recover the name). - Validate actor (email/IP/UA for
user_actor) against identity admins. - For claims/adds, confirm DNS ownership work was planned. Look for related invites, SSO, or membership changes in the same window.
- New Enterprise onboarding routinely verifies corporate domains — match change management.
- On unauthorized change: revert via Anthropic administration and review users added under the affected domain.
from logs-anthropic.audit-* metadata _id, _version, _index
| where
data_stream.dataset == "anthropic.audit" and
mv_contains(event.category, "configuration") and
event.action in (
"org_domain_verified",
"org_domain_removed",
"org_domain_add_initiated",
"domain_claim_initiated"
)
| keep _id, _version, _index, @timestamp, event.*, organization.*, user.*, source.*, user_agent.*, anthropic.audit.*, data_stream.*
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- Id: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Account Manipulation
- Id: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/