Suspicious PowerShell from npm Package Install
Detects PowerShell launched with an encoded command or a download cradle whose process ancestry includes a Node.js
npm package execution (npx-cli.js with a scoped or versioned package). Malicious npm packages and supply-chain
compromises commonly run this from install or postinstall scripts to fetch and execute a second stage.
Rule type: esql
Rule indices:
Rule Severity: high
Risk Score: 73
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Platform: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Execution
- Tactic: Initial Access
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Tactic: Command and Control
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Rule Type: ES|QL
- Threat: Supply Chain
- Threat: Script-Based Execution
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
This rule is designed for data generated by Elastic Defend, which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.
Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend
PowerShell with an encoded command or a download cradle (DownloadString, Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-Expression,
BITS) ran in a process tree that includes Node.js executing an npm package via npx-cli.js. That pattern is common
in malicious npm packages and compromised dependencies.
- Review
all_pkg_cmdlinefor thenpx-cli.jsinvocation and identify the package name, scope, and version. - Inspect
process.command_lineand whetheris_encoded_powershelloris_download_cradleis true. Decode any-EncodedCommandpayload and extract URLs, file paths, and follow-on commands. - Correlate the same
host.idanduser.namefor new files, outbound connections, and additional child processes from the Node.js or PowerShell tree. - Check recent npm installs,
package.jsonlifecycle scripts, and lockfile changes on the host for the package inall_pkg_cmdline.
- Some legitimate packages download helpers or build tools with PowerShell during install. Confirm the package, publisher, and destination URL before excluding.
- Scope exceptions to a known package command line, host, or user. Do not broadly exclude
npxorpowershell.exe.
- If malicious, isolate the host, stop the Node.js and PowerShell process tree, and remove the package and any dropped files.
- Rotate credentials and tokens available to that user or build environment, including npm tokens and cloud keys.
- Block the package and related domains, and hunt for the same
all_pkg_cmdlineand PowerShell command line on other hosts.
FROM logs-endpoint.events.process-* METADATA _id, _version, _index
| EVAL is_pkg_install = CASE(
// npm
process.parent.name == "node.exe" AND (
process.parent.command_line LIKE "*npx-cli.js*" OR
process.parent.command_line LIKE "*npm-cli.js*" OR
process.parent.command_line LIKE """*\\npm-cache\\_npx\\*"""
), true,
false
)
| EVAL cmdline_lower = TO_LOWER(process.command_line)
| EVAL is_encoded_powershell = CASE(
TO_LOWER(process.name) == "powershell.exe" AND (
cmdline_lower LIKE "* -enc*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* -en *" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* -ec *" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* -ec:*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*frombase64*"
), true, false
)
// plain -Command / dot-sourced / no-flag download cradles that skip -EncodedCommand entirely
| EVAL is_download_cradle = CASE(
process.name == "powershell.exe" AND (
cmdline_lower LIKE "*downloadstring*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*downloadfile*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*downloaddata*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*net.webclient*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*new-object*webclient*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*invoke-webrequest*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* iwr *" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* iwr(*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*invoke-restmethod*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* irm *" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* irm(*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*invoke-expression*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* iex *" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "* iex(*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*start-bitstransfer*" OR
cmdline_lower LIKE "*bitstransfer*"
), true, false
)
| EVAL is_susp_powershell = CASE(is_encoded_powershell OR is_download_cradle, true, false)
| WHERE process.Ext.ancestry IS NOT NULL AND (is_susp_powershell OR is_pkg_install)
// Capture entity_ids for package install parent processes
| EVAL all_entity_id = CASE(is_pkg_install, process.parent.entity_id, "null")
// Collect all package install entity_ids globally
| INLINE STATS all_pkg_entity_ids = VALUES(all_entity_id), all_pkg_cmdline = VALUES(process.parent.command_line) WHERE all_entity_id != "null" by host.id
// Find which package install entity_ids appear in this process's ancestry
| EVAL Esql.pkg_ancestor_ids = MV_INTERSECTION(all_pkg_entity_ids, process.Ext.ancestry)
// susp powershell (encoded or download cradle) and descended from an npm package install process
| WHERE Esql.pkg_ancestor_ids IS NOT NULL AND is_susp_powershell
| KEEP _id, _version, _index, data_stream.namespace, host.id, host.name, user.name, process.entity_id, process.executable, process.command_line, process.parent.executable, all_pkg_cmdline,
is_encoded_powershell, is_download_cradle
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- Id: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- Id: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
Sub Technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- Id: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Initial Access
- Id: TA0001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/
Technique:
- Name: Supply Chain Compromise
- Id: T1195
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/
Sub Technique:
- Name: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- Id: T1195.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001/
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Obfuscated Files or Information
- Id: T1027
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/
Sub Technique:
- Name: Command Obfuscation
- Id: T1027.010
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/010/
Framework: MITRE ATT&CK
Tactic:
- Name: Command and Control
- Id: TA0011
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/
Technique:
- Name: Ingress Tool Transfer
- Id: T1105
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/