Microsoft Exchange Server UM Writing Suspicious Files

Identifies suspicious files being written by the Microsoft Exchange Server Unified Messaging (UM) service. This activity has been observed exploiting CVE-2021-26858.

Rule type: eql
Rule indices:

• winlogbeat-*
• logs-endpoint.events.file-*
• logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
• endgame-*
• logs-m365_defender.event-*
• logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*

Rule Severity: medium
Risk Score: 47
Runs every:
Searches indices from: now-9m
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:

• https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers
• https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities

Tags:

• Domain: Endpoint
• OS: Windows
• Use Case: Threat Detection
• Tactic: Initial Access
• Tactic: Lateral Movement
• Data Source: Elastic Endgame
• Use Case: Vulnerability
• Data Source: Elastic Defend
• Data Source: Sysmon
• Data Source: Microsoft Defender XDR
• Data Source: SentinelOne
• Resources: Investigation Guide

Version: 314
Rule authors:

• Elastic
• Austin Songer

Rule license: Elastic License v2

This rule is designed for data generated by Elastic Defend, which provides native endpoint detection and response, along with event enrichments designed to work with our detection rules.

Setup instructions: https://ela.st/install-elastic-defend

This rule also supports the following third-party data sources. For setup instructions, refer to the links below:

• Microsoft Defender XDR
• SentinelOne Cloud Funnel
• Sysmon Event ID 11 - File Create

Positive hits can be checked against the established Microsoft baselines.

Microsoft highly recommends that the best course of action is patching, but this may not protect already compromised systems from existing intrusions. Other tools for detecting and mitigating can be found within their Exchange support repository

file where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "creation" and
  process.name : ("UMWorkerProcess.exe", "umservice.exe") and
  file.extension : ("php", "jsp", "js", "aspx", "asmx", "asax", "cfm", "shtml") and
  (
    file.path : "?:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\aspnet_client\\*" or

    (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\*" and
       not (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\owa\\auth\\version\\*" or
            file.name : ("errorFE.aspx", "expiredpassword.aspx", "frowny.aspx", "GetIdToken.htm", "logoff.aspx",
                        "logon.aspx", "OutlookCN.aspx", "RedirSuiteServiceProxy.aspx", "signout.aspx"))) or

    (file.path : "?:\\*\\Microsoft\\Exchange Server*\\FrontEnd\\HttpProxy\\ecp\\auth\\*" and
       not file.name : "TimeoutLogoff.aspx")
  )
		

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

• Tactic:

  • Name: Initial Access
  • Id: TA0001
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/

• Technique:

  • Name: Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • Id: T1190
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

• Tactic:

  • Name: Lateral Movement
  • Id: TA0008
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/

• Technique:

  • Name: Exploitation of Remote Services
  • Id: T1210
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1210/

Framework: MITRE ATT&CK

• Tactic:

  • Name: Persistence
  • Id: TA0003
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/

• Technique:

  • Name: Server Software Component
  • Id: T1505
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/

• Sub Technique:

  • Name: Web Shell
  • Id: T1505.003
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/