﻿---
title: Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading
description: Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching command-line and process executable...
url: https://www.elastic.co/elastic/docs-builder/docs/2542/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_masquerading_werfault
---

# Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading
Identifies suspicious instances of the Windows Error Reporting process (WerFault.exe or Wermgr.exe) with matching
command-line and process executable values performing outgoing network connections. This may be indicative of a
masquerading attempt to evade suspicious child process behavior detections.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.process-*
- logs-endpoint.events.network-*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: ?
**References**:
- [https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1235533224337641473](https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1235533224337641473)
- [https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/werfault-command-line-switches-v0-1/](https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/09/20/werfault-command-line-switches-v0-1/)
- [https://app.any.run/tasks/26051d84-b68e-4afb-8a9a-76921a271b81/](https://app.any.run/tasks/26051d84-b68e-4afb-8a9a-76921a271b81/)
- [https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-security-uncovers-blister-malware-campaign](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/elastic-security-uncovers-blister-malware-campaign)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Sysmon

**Version**: ?
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Potential Windows Error Manager Masquerading

By examining the specific traits of Windows binaries -- such as process trees, command lines, network connections, registry modifications, and so on -- it's possible to establish a baseline of normal activity. Deviations from this baseline can indicate malicious activity, such as masquerading and deserve further investigation.
This rule identifies a potential malicious process masquerading as `wermgr.exe` or `WerFault.exe`, by looking for a process creation with no arguments followed by a network connection.> **Note**:
This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Investigate any abnormal behavior by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
- Examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
  - Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
  - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
  - Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
  - $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
  - $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Retrieve the files' SHA-256 hash values using the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet and search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Investigate potentially compromised accounts. Analysts can do this by searching for login events (for example, 4624) to the target host after the registry modification.


### False positive analysis

- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.


### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).


## Rule Query

```eql
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s
  [process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type:"start" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and
    (process.args_count == 1 and
      /* Excludes bug where a missing closing quote sets args_count to 1 despite extra args */
      not process.command_line regex~ """\".*\.exe[^\"].*""")]
  [network where host.os.type == "windows" and process.name : ("wermgr.exe", "WerFault.exe") and network.protocol != "dns" and
    network.direction : ("outgoing", "egress") and destination.ip !="::1" and destination.ip !="127.0.0.1"
  ]
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: [https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Masquerading
- Id: T1036
- Reference URL: [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- Id: T1036.005
- Reference URL: [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/)