﻿---
title: Potential RemoteMonologue Attack
description: Identifies attempt to perform session hijack via COM object registry modification by setting the RunAs value to Interactive User. Rule type: eql Rule...
url: https://www.elastic.co/elastic/docs-builder/docs/2808/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/defense_evasion_regmod_remotemonologue
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Potential RemoteMonologue Attack
Identifies attempt to perform session hijack via COM object registry modification by setting the RunAs value to
Interactive User.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- logs-endpoint.events.registry-*
- endgame-*
- logs-m365_defender.event-*
- logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/remotemonologue-weaponizing-dcom-ntlm-authentication-coercions#1](https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/remotemonologue-weaponizing-dcom-ntlm-authentication-coercions#1)](https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/remotemonologue-weaponizing-dcom-ntlm-authentication-coercions#1)
- [[https://github.com/xforcered/RemoteMonologue](https://github.com/xforcered/RemoteMonologue)](https://github.com/xforcered/RemoteMonologue)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Defense Evasion
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
- Data Source: SentinelOne
- Data Source: Sysmon
- Resources: Investigation Guide

**Version**: 4
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Potential RemoteMonologue Attack


### Possible investigation steps

- Review the registry event logs to confirm the modification of the RunAs value in the specified registry paths, ensuring the change was not part of a legitimate administrative action.
- Identify the user account and process responsible for the registry modification by examining the event logs for associated user and process information.
- Check for any recent remote authentication attempts or sessions on the affected host to determine if this activity is associated with lateral movement or not.
- Investigate the timeline of the registry change to correlate with any other suspicious activities or alerts on the host, such as the execution of unusual processes or network connections.


### False positive analysis

- Software updates or installations that modify COM settings.
- Automated scripts or management tools that adjust COM configurations.


### Response and remediation

- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the adversary.
- Modify the registry value back to its secure state, ensuring that "RunAs" value is not set to "Interactive User".
- Conduct a thorough review of recent user activity and system logs to identify any unauthorized access or changes made during the period NLA was disabled.
- Reset passwords for all accounts that have accessed the affected system to mitigate potential credential compromise.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
- Implement enhanced monitoring on the affected system and similar endpoints to detect any further attempts to disable NLA or other suspicious activities.


## Rule Query

```eql
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action != "deletion" and
  registry.value == "RunAs" and registry.data.strings : "Interactive User" and

  not 
  (
    (
      process.executable : (
        "C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Platform\\4.*\\MsMpEng.exe",
        "C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender\\MsMpEng.exe"
      ) and
      registry.path : "*\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{1111A26D-EF95-4A45-9F55-21E52ADF9887}\\RunAs"
    ) or
    (
      process.executable : (
        "C:\\Program Files\\TeamViewer\\TeamViewer.exe",
        "C:\\Program Files (x86)\\TeamViewer\\TeamViewer.exe"
      ) and
      registry.path : "*\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{850A928D-5456-4865-BBE5-42635F1EBCA1}\\RunAs"
    ) or
    (
      process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe" and
      registry.path : "*\\S-1-*Classes\\AppID\\{D3E34B21-9D75-101A-8C3D-00AA001A1652}\\RunAs"
    ) or
    (
      process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecurityHealthService.exe" and
      registry.path : (
        "*\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{1D278EEF-5C38-4F2A-8C7D-D5C13B662567}\\RunAs",
        "*\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{7E55A26D-EF95-4A45-9F55-21E52ADF9878}\\RunAs"
      )
    ) or
    (
      process.executable : "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SecurityHealthService.exe" and
      registry.path : (
        "*\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{1D278EEF-5C38-4F2A-8C7D-D5C13B662567}\\RunAs",
        "*\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{7E55A26D-EF95-4A45-9F55-21E52ADF9878}\\RunAs"
      )
    ) or
    registry.path : (
      "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\ClickToRun\\VREGISTRY_*",
      "\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Office\\ClickToRun\\VREGISTRY_*"
    ) or
    (process.executable : "C:\\windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe" and ?user.id : "S-1-5-18")
  )
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Modify Registry
- Id: T1112
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Impair Defenses
- Id: T1562
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/)