﻿---
title: Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification
description: User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run in the security context of a...
url: https://www.elastic.co/elastic/docs-builder/docs/2831/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/windows/privilege_escalation_disable_uac_registry
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification
User Account Control (UAC) can help mitigate the impact of malware on Windows hosts. With UAC, apps and tasks always run
in the security context of a non-administrator account, unless an administrator specifically authorizes
administrator-level access to the system. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass User Access Control
(UAC) protection.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.registry-*
- logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*
- endgame-*
- logs-m365_defender.event-*
- logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*
- logs-crowdstrike.fdr*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=796](https://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=796)](https://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=796)
- [[https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-group-policy-and-registry-key-settings)
- [[https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-overview)
- [[https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dissecting-remcos-rat-part-four](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dissecting-remcos-rat-part-four)](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/dissecting-remcos-rat-part-four)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Windows
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Privilege Escalation
- Resources: Investigation Guide
- Data Source: Elastic Endgame
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Data Source: Sysmon
- Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint
- Data Source: SentinelOne
- Data Source: Crowdstrike

**Version**: 315
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Disabling User Account Control via Registry Modification

Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as low to high integrity levels) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. UAC can deny an operation under high-integrity enforcement, or allow the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and enter an administrator password when prompted.
For more information about the UAC and how it works, check the [official Microsoft docs page](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works).
Attackers may disable UAC to execute code directly in high integrity. This rule identifies registry value changes to bypass the UAC protection.

#### Possible investigation steps

- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Inspect the host for suspicious or abnormal behaviors in the alert timeframe.
- Investigate abnormal behaviors observed by the subject process such as network connections, registry or file modifications, and any spawned child processes.
- Analyze non-system processes executed with high integrity after UAC was disabled for unknown or suspicious processes.
- Retrieve the suspicious processes' executables and determine if they are malicious:
  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
  - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
  - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
- Service creation and launch activities.
- Scheduled tasks creation.
- Use the PowerShell `Get-FileHash` cmdlet to get the files' SHA-256 hash values.
  - Search for the existence and reputation of the hashes in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.


### False positive analysis

- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.


### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Restore UAC settings to the desired state.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).


## Rule Query

```eql
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "change" and
  registry.value : ("EnableLUA", "ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin", "PromptOnSecureDesktop") and
  registry.data.strings : ("0", "0x00000000")

  /*
    Full registry key path omitted due to data source variations:
    HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\EnableLUA
    HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
    HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\PromptOnSecureDesktop
  */
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Privilege Escalation
- Id: TA0004
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- Id: T1548
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Bypass User Account Control
- Id: T1548.002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Defense Evasion
- Id: TA0005
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Modify Registry
- Id: T1112
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- Id: T1548
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Bypass User Account Control
- Id: T1548.002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Impair Defenses
- Id: T1562
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Disable or Modify Tools
- Id: T1562.001
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/)