Unusual Process Execution Path - Alternate Data Stream
Identifies processes running from an Alternate Data Stream. This is uncommon for legitimate processes and sometimes done by adversaries to hide malware.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 6
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp for this rule to work.
process where event.type == "start" and
process.args : "?:\\*:*" and process.args_count == 1
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Hide Artifacts
- ID: T1564
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/
Sub-technique:
- Name: NTFS File Attributes
- ID: T1564.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/004/