Component Object Model Hijacking
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
Identifies Component Object Model (COM) hijacking via registry modification. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to COM objects.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
registry where
/* uncomment once length is stable length(bytes_written_string) > 0 and */
(registry.path : "HK*}\\InprocServer32\\" and registry.data.strings: ("scrobj.dll", "C:\\*\\scrobj.dll") and
not registry.path : "*\\{06290BD*-48AA-11D2-8432-006008C3FBFC}\\*")
or
/* in general COM Registry changes on Users Hive is less noisy and worth alerting */
(registry.path : ("HKEY_USERS\\*Classes\\*\\InprocServer32\\",
"HKEY_USERS\\*Classes\\*\\LocalServer32\\",
"HKEY_USERS\\*Classes\\*\\DelegateExecute\\",
"HKEY_USERS\\*Classes\\*\\TreatAs\\",
"HKEY_USERS\\*Classes\\CLSID\\*\\ScriptletURL\\") and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Program Files*\\Veeam\\Backup and Replication\\Console\\veeam.backup.shell.exe" and
registry.path : "HKEY_USERS\\S-1-5-21-*_Classes\\CLSID\\*\\LocalServer32\\") and
/* not necessary but good for filtering privileged installations */
user.domain != "NT AUTHORITY")
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Event Triggered Execution
- ID: T1546
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Component Object Model Hijacking
- ID: T1546.015
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/015/