Process Created with an Elevated Token
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
Identifies the creation of a process running as SYSTEM and impersonating a Windows core binary privileges. Adversaries may create a new process with a different token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
Severity: high
Risk score: 73
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
- https://lengjibo.github.io/token/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithtokenw
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Privilege Escalation
Version: 1
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
/* This rule is only compatible with Elastic Endpoint 8.4+ */
process where event.action == "start" and
/* CreateProcessWithToken and effective parent is a privileged MS native binary used as a target for token theft */
user.id : "S-1-5-18" and
/* Token Theft target process usually running as service are located in one of the following paths */
process.Ext.effective_parent.executable :
("?:\\Windows\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\ProgramData\\*") and
not (process.Ext.effective_parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and
process.parent.executable : "?:\\Windows\\System32\\Utilman.exe" and process.parent.args : "/debug") and
not process.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFault.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\WerFaultSecure.exe",
"?:\\windows\\system32\\WerMgr.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SoftwareDistribution\\Download\\Install\\securityhealthsetup.exe") and
not process.parent.executable : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe", "?:\\Windows\\system32\\svchost.exe", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe", "?:\\Program Files\\*.exe", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
"C:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\*") and
not (process.code_signature.trusted == true and
process.code_signature.subject_name in ("philandro Software GmbH", "Freedom Scientific Inc.", "TeamViewer Germany GmbH", "Projector.is, Inc.", "TeamViewer GmbH", "Cisco WebEx LLC", "Dell Inc"))
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Privilege Escalation
- ID: TA0004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/
Technique:
- Name: Access Token Manipulation
- ID: T1134
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Create Process with Token
- ID: T1134.002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/002/