Adobe Hijack Persistence
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
Detects writing executable files that will be automatically launched by Adobe Acrobat Reader on launch.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: low
Risk score: 21
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Persistence
Version: 10
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
Attackers can replace the RdrCEF.exe
executable with their own to maintain their access, which will be launched
whenever Adobe Acrobat Reader is executed.
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree).
- Identify the user account that performed the action.
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Check for similar behavior in other hosts on the environment.
- Retrieve the file and determine if it is malicious:
- Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- File and registry access, modification, and creation activities.
- Service creation and launch activities.
- Scheduled tasks creation.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities:
- Use the PowerShell Get-FileHash cmdlet to get the SHA-256 hash value of the file.
- Search for the existence and reputation of this file in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
- This activity is unlikely to happen legitimately. Benign true positives (B-TPs) can be added as exceptions if necessary.
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement any temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation required to contain the malware.
- Immediately block the IoCs identified.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified on the triage.
- Disable the involved accounts, or restrict their ability to log on remotely.
- Reset passwords for the user account and other potentially compromised accounts (email, services, CRMs, etc.).
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested
and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested
to @timestamp for this rule to work.
file where event.type == "creation" and
file.path : ("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\AcroCEF\\RdrCEF.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat Reader DC\\Reader\\AcroCEF\\RdrCEF.exe") and
not process.name : "msiexec.exe"
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Persistence
- ID: TA0003
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/
Technique:
- Name: Hijack Execution Flow
- ID: T1574
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Services File Permissions Weakness
- ID: T1574.010
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/010/