Loading

Port Forwarding Rule Addition

Elastic Stack Serverless Security

Identifies the creation of a new port forwarding rule. An adversary may abuse this technique to bypass network segmentation restrictions.

Rule type: eql

Rule indices:

  • winlogbeat-*
  • logs-endpoint.events.*
  • logs-windows.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

Tags:

  • Elastic
  • Host
  • Windows
  • Threat Detection
  • Command and Control

Version: 6

Rule authors:

  • Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

Network port forwarding is a mechanism to redirect incoming TCP connections (IPv4 or IPv6) from the local TCP port to
any other port number, or even to a port on a remote computer.

Attackers may configure port forwarding rules to bypass network segmentation restrictions, using the host as a jump box
to access previously unreachable systems.

This rule monitors the modifications to the HKLM\SYSTEM\*ControlSet*\Services\PortProxy\v4tov4\ subkeys.

  • Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree).
  • Identify the user account that performed the action and whether it should perform this kind of action.
  • Contact the account owner and confirm whether they are aware of this activity.
  • Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
  • Check for similar behavior in other hosts on the environment.
  • Identify the target host IP address, verify if connections were made from the host where the modification occurred,
    and check what credentials were used to perform it.
    • Investigate suspicious login activity, such as unauthorized access and logins from outside working hours and unusual locations.
  • This mechanism can be used legitimately. Analysts can dismiss the alert if the Administrator is aware of the activity
    and there are justifications for this configuration.
  • If this activity is expected and noisy in your environment, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination
    of user and command line conditions.
  • Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
  • Delete the port forwarding rule.
  • Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
  • If potential malware or credential compromise activities were discovered during the alert triage, activate the respective
    incident response plan.

If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp for this rule to work.

registry where registry.path : "HKLM\\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\\Services\\PortProxy\\v4tov4\\*"

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM