Suspicious PowerShell Engine ImageLoad
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
Identifies the PowerShell engine being invoked by unexpected processes. Rather than executing PowerShell functionality with powershell.exe, some attackers do this to operate more stealthily.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested
and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested
to @timestamp for this rule to work.
library where dll.name : ("System.Management.Automation.ni.dll", "System.Management.Automation.dll") and
/* add false positives relevant to your environment here */
not process.executable : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\sdiagnhost.exe") and
not process.executable regex~ """C:\\Program Files( \(x86\))?\\*\.exe""" and
not process.name :
(
"Altaro.SubAgent.exe",
"AppV_Manage.exe",
"azureadconnect.exe",
"CcmExec.exe",
"configsyncrun.exe",
"choco.exe",
"ctxappvservice.exe",
"DVLS.Console.exe",
"edgetransport.exe",
"exsetup.exe",
"forefrontactivedirectoryconnector.exe",
"InstallUtil.exe",
"JenkinsOnDesktop.exe",
"Microsoft.EnterpriseManagement.ServiceManager.UI.Console.exe",
"mmc.exe",
"mscorsvw.exe",
"msexchangedelivery.exe",
"msexchangefrontendtransport.exe",
"msexchangehmworker.exe",
"msexchangesubmission.exe",
"msiexec.exe",
"MsiExec.exe",
"noderunner.exe",
"NServiceBus.Host.exe",
"NServiceBus.Host32.exe",
"NServiceBus.Hosting.Azure.HostProcess.exe",
"OuiGui.WPF.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"powershell_ise.exe",
"pwsh.exe",
"SCCMCliCtrWPF.exe",
"ScriptEditor.exe",
"ScriptRunner.exe",
"sdiagnhost.exe",
"servermanager.exe",
"setup100.exe",
"ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe",
"SPCAF.Client.exe",
"SPCAF.SettingsEditor.exe",
"SQLPS.exe",
"telemetryservice.exe",
"UMWorkerProcess.exe",
"w3wp.exe",
"wsmprovhost.exe"
)
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
Sub-technique:
- Name: PowerShell
- ID: T1059.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/