AWS RDS Snapshot Restored

Elastic Stack Serverless Security

Identifies when an attempt was made to restore an RDS Snapshot. Snapshots are sometimes shared by threat actors in order to exfiltrate bulk data or evade detection after performing malicious activities. If the permissions were modified, verify if the snapshot was shared with an unauthorized or unexpected AWS account.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

• filebeat-*
• logs-aws*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: None (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

• https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonRDS/latest/APIReference/API_RestoreDBInstanceFromDBSnapshot.html
• https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/master/pacu/modules/rds__explore_snapshots/main.py

Tags:

• Elastic
• Cloud
• AWS
• Continuous Monitoring
• SecOps
• Asset Visibility
• Defense Evasion

Version: 5

Rule authors:

• Austin Songer

Rule license: Elastic License v2

event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail and event.provider:rds.amazonaws.com and event.action:RestoreDBInstanceFromDBSnapshot and
event.outcome:success

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

• Tactic:

  • Name: Defense Evasion
  • ID: TA0005
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/

• Technique:

  • Name: Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
  • ID: T1578
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/

• Sub-technique:

  • Name: Revert Cloud Instance
  • ID: T1578.004
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004/