Unusual Parent Process for cmd.exe
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
Identifies a suspicious parent child process relationship with cmd.exe descending from an unusual process.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Execution
Version: 5
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested to @timestamp for this rule to work.
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name : "cmd.exe" and
process.parent.name : ("lsass.exe",
"csrss.exe",
"epad.exe",
"regsvr32.exe",
"dllhost.exe",
"LogonUI.exe",
"wermgr.exe",
"spoolsv.exe",
"jucheck.exe",
"jusched.exe",
"ctfmon.exe",
"taskhostw.exe",
"GoogleUpdate.exe",
"sppsvc.exe",
"sihost.exe",
"slui.exe",
"SIHClient.exe",
"SearchIndexer.exe",
"SearchProtocolHost.exe",
"FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe",
"WerFault.exe",
"WUDFHost.exe",
"unsecapp.exe",
"wlanext.exe" )
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Execution
- ID: TA0002
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/
Technique:
- Name: Command and Scripting Interpreter
- ID: T1059
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/