Kubernetes Pod Created With HostIPC

Elastic Stack Serverless Security

This rule detects an attempt to create or modify a pod using the host IPC namespace. This gives access to data used by any pod that also use the host�s IPC namespace. If any process on the host or any processes in a pod uses the host�s inter-process communication mechanisms (shared memory, semaphore arrays, message queues, etc.), an attacker can read/write to those same mechanisms. They may look for files in /dev/shm or use ipcs to check for any IPC facilities being used.

Rule type: query

Rule indices:

• logs-kubernetes.*

Severity: medium

Risk score: 47

Runs every: 5m

Searches indices from: None (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time)

Maximum alerts per execution: 100

References:

• https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/11/10/detection-engineering-for-kubernetes-clusters/#part3-kubernetes-detections
• https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-policy/#host-namespaces
• https://bishopfox.com/blog/kubernetes-pod-privilege-escalation

Tags:

• Elastic
• Kubernetes
• Continuous Monitoring
• Execution
• Privilege Escalation

Version: 2

Rule authors:

• Elastic

Rule license: Elastic License v2

kubernetes.audit.objectRef.resource:"pods" and kubernetes.audit.verb:("create" or "update" or "patch") and kubernetes.audit.requestObject.spec.hostIPC:true

Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM

• Tactic:

  • Name: Privilege Escalation
  • ID: TA0004
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/

• Technique:

  • Name: Escape to Host
  • ID: T1611
  • Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1611/