Hosts File Modified
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
The hosts file on endpoints is used to control manual IP address to hostname resolutions. The hosts file is the first point of lookup for DNS hostname resolution so if adversaries can modify the endpoint hosts file, they can route traffic to malicious infrastructure. This rule detects modifications to the hosts file on Microsoft Windows, Linux (Ubuntu or RHEL) and macOS systems.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- auditbeat-*
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-endpoint.events.*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References:
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Linux
- Windows
- macOS
- Threat Detection
- Impact
Version: 9
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
For Windows systems using Auditbeat, this rule requires adding C:/Windows/System32/drivers/etc
as an additional path in the 'file_integrity' module of auditbeat.yml.
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define event.ingested
and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate event.ingested
to @timestamp for this rule to work.
any where
/* file events for creation; file change events are not captured by some of the included sources for linux and so may
miss this, which is the purpose of the process + command line args logic below */
(
event.category == "file" and event.type in ("change", "creation") and
file.path : ("/private/etc/hosts", "/etc/hosts", "?:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts")
)
or
/* process events for change targeting linux only */
(
event.category == "process" and event.type in ("start") and
process.name in ("nano", "vim", "vi", "emacs", "echo", "sed") and
process.args : ("/etc/hosts")
)
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Impact
- ID: TA0040
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/
Technique:
- Name: Data Manipulation
- ID: T1565
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/
Sub-technique:
- Name: Stored Data Manipulation
- ID: T1565.001
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/001/