Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace
Elastic Stack Serverless Security
Identifies when a process is created and immediately accessed from an unknown memory code region and by the same parent process. This may indicate a code injection or hollowing attempt.
Rule type: eql
Rule indices:
- winlogbeat-*
- logs-windows.*
Severity: medium
Risk score: 47
Runs every: 5m
Searches indices from: now-9m (https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/elasticsearch/reference/current/common-options.html#date-math[Date Math format], see also Additional look-back time
)
Maximum alerts per execution: 100
References: None
Tags:
- Elastic
- Host
- Windows
- Threat Detection
- Defense Evasion
Version: 100
Rule authors:
- Elastic
Rule license: Elastic License v2
sequence by host.id with maxspan=1m
[process where event.code == "1" and
/* sysmon process creation */
process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "eqnedt32.exe", "fltldr.exe",
"mspub.exe", "msaccess.exe","cscript.exe", "wscript.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
"mshta.exe", "wmic.exe", "cmstp.exe", "msxsl.exe") and
/* noisy FP patterns */
not (process.parent.name : "EXCEL.EXE" and process.executable : "?:\\Program Files\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office*\\ADDINS\\*.exe") and
not (process.executable : "?:\\Windows\\splwow64.exe" and process.args in ("8192", "12288") and process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe")) and
not (process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.args : ("?:\\WINDOWS\\Installer\\MSI*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc", "--no-sandbox")) and
not (process.executable :
("?:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\EdgeWebView\\Application\\*\\msedgewebview2.exe",
"?:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat DC\\Acrobat\\Acrobat.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\DWWIN.EXE") and
process.parent.name : ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "outlook.exe", "powerpnt.exe")) and
not (process.parent.name : "regsvr32.exe" and process.parent.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*"))
] by process.parent.entity_id, process.entity_id
[process where event.code == "10" and
/* Sysmon process access event from unknown module */
winlog.event_data.CallTrace : "*UNKNOWN*"] by process.entity_id, winlog.event_data.TargetProcessGUID
Framework: MITRE ATT&CKTM
Tactic:
- Name: Defense Evasion
- ID: TA0005
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/
Technique:
- Name: Process Injection
- ID: T1055
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/